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ABSTRACT 
 
CONFIDENCE ENHANCED PERFORMANCE:  
DOES IT EXIST AND IF SO HOW DOES IT WORK? 
 
MURAD Zahra 
M.A. Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Kevin Hasker 
 
September 2010 
 
 We empirically test and investigate the psychological mechanism behind the theory 
of Confidence Enhanced Performance (Compte and Postlewaite, 2004). This theory 
suggests that if confidence enhances performance, then people will benefit from having the 
commonly observed tendency to discount past failures and be overconfident. We test this 
hypothesis using three tasks which require different cognitive abilities. Our findings are 
partially supportive of the theory.  However, we cannot conclude that any of our confidence 
variables significantly and positively affect performance. Only in one task (the Picture 
Recall task) we find that enhanced mood level positively affects performance. The view that 
people are generally overconfident when performing tasks with imperfect feedback is not 
upheld. Furthermore, there seem to be strong task differences in both levels of confidence 
and the effects of psychological variables on performance. 
Keywords: Economic Experiments, Overconfidence, Cognitive Performance, Choice under 
Risk 
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ÖZET 
 
ÖZGÜVENĠN GELĠġTĠRDĠĞĠ PERFORMANS: 
VAR MIDIR VE VARSA HANGI DURUMLARDA GEÇERLĠDĠR? 
 
MURAD Zahra 
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Kevin Hasker 
 
Eylül 2010 
 
   
ÇalıĢmamızda Özgüvenin GeliĢtirdiği Performans modelinin (Compte ve Postlewaite, 
2004) altındakı psikolojik mekanizmayı bulmak için deneysel olarak test ve analiz ediyoruz. 
Bu model özgüvenin performansı iyileĢtirdiğini varsayarak insanların geçmiĢ 
baĢarısızlıklarını görmezden gelip aĢırı özgüvenin refahlarının artıĢına neden olacağını ileri 
sürmektedir. Bu hipotezi farklı biliĢsel beceriler talep eden üç farklı görev kullanıp deneysel 
olarak test ediyoruz. Bulgularımız insanların gelecek performansları hakkında aĢırı iyimser 
olduklarını doğrulamasına rağmen, geçmiĢteki performansları hakkında yeterince net 
olduklarını da öne sürmektedir. Deneylerimiz sonucunda sadece bir görevde özgüvenin ve 
moral seviyesinin (film klipleri yolu ile) performansı geliĢtirdiğini buluyoruz. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ġktisat Deneyleri, Özgüven, Kognitif Performans, Risk altında Seçim 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Experimental analysis is now an established field in economics; indeed in 2002 
Vernon L. Smith and Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for their contributions 
in this field. One underlying conclusion of this field is that we cannot simply ignore 
the psychological process that is behind decision-making. Daniel Kahneman was 
honored for blending psychology and economics. We contribute to this tradition 
with our research. Specifically, we empirically test and investigate the psychological 
mechanism behind the theory of Confidence Enhanced Performance (Compte & 
Postlewaite, 2004). This theory suggests that if confidence enhances performance 
then people will benefit from having the - commonly observed - tendency to 
discount past failures and be overconfident. There are several other recent papers 
theoretically analyzing overconfidence, which show that when individuals are 
overoptimistic, this overoptimism (eg. of managers about the projects overtaken) can 
be beneficial to agents and increase their welfare (Van den Steen, 2004; Gervais et 
al., 2007). 
 The term “confidence” is widely used and has several everyday and more 
technical meanings. In the psychology of decision making, confidence has tended to 
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be treated as a kind of subjective probability judgment of something happening or 
being the case, such as it raining tomorrow or one’s answer to a question being right 
– a number of similar judgments of this sort can be compared against the objective 
probabilities measured as relative frequencies of rainy days or correctly answered 
questions, in order to determine the “realism” of judges’ confidence (see e.g., 
Lichtenstein et al., 1982).  Although this definition of confidence is clear and easy to 
work with experimentally we feel that it is lacking in certain characteristics that are 
relevant to understanding how confidence might enhance performance, most 
particularly, the emotional dimension of confidence most clearly seen in the popular 
notion of  “feeling (self) confident”. Accordingly we wish to propose that 
confidence has at least two facets or measures: an affective one (i.e. related either to 
specific emotion or general mood) and a cognitive one (i.e. related to one’s beliefs 
about the likelihood of events or states of the world). More generally, we wish to 
suggest that confidence is a kind of attitude. Attitudes are evaluations of objects that 
then guide behavior towards those objects – specifically one’s tendency to approach 
or avoid them. Confidence is likewise an evaluation of an object (an event or state) 
that will influence one’s tendency to approach or avoid that object. So, for example, 
I might say that I am “confident” that I can beat Peter at tennis but not at chess, thus 
I positively evaluate my prospects of playing Peter at tennis but not those of playing 
him at chess. As a consequence I am more likely to challenge Peter to a game of 
tennis than one of chess.   
 A common characterization of attitudes maintains that they have three 
measures: cognitive, affective and behavioral. We therefore should add a behavioral 
measure to our definition of confidence – this would be the tendency to approach or 
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avoid objects. One important manifestation of the behavioral measure of confidence 
would be risk taking so, for instance, one might be more prepared to wager money 
on beating Peter at tennis than on beating him at chess. In our experiment we will 
deal with all three of these measures. 
        While Compte and Postlewaite (2004) make a valuable theoretic contribution 
they do not answer the question of whether Confidence Enhanced Performance 
(CEP hereafter) does have an impact in practice, and what is the psychological 
mechanism by which confidence enhances performance. We have identified three 
mechanisms of affective measure of confidence when being successful in the past 
could have impact future performance. First it could increase confidence itself, 
defined as a feeling of competence or power, this may lead to better performance by 
increased motivation and effort, second it could make someone be happy or in a 
good mood and this might release resources from mood repair. And third, it could 
make someone excited or aroused, thus, according to the Yerkes-Dodson Law 
(Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) easy tasks might be best performed at high levels of 
arousal and hard tasks at low levels of arousal. We also measure confidence in our 
experiment by its cognitive (the perception of success rate probabilistically) and 
behavioral (selecting risky vs. safe option) measures. Hence, our experiment is 
designed to first find out when, and if, CEP is effective and second to determine 
which measures of confidence cause the improvement. 
     It should be clear that CEP does not occur in every environment. Indeed 
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) find that in a market entry game overconfidence leads 
to excessive entry and decreased net profit. Bolger et al. (2008) further find that it is 
absolute overconfidence that causes excessive entry (i.e. not comparison of abilities 
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with competitors). Nowell and Alston (2007) and Kruger and Dunning (1999) show 
that bad students seem to be unaware of their low skill level resulting in them being 
overconfident, leading to less effort for the course work. Compte and Postlewaite 
(2004) discuss essentially decision theoretic environments, thus we will look at 
several different decision theory tasks to see if CEP occurs. Namely, we have three 
different tasks which require three different cognitive abilities: short term memory, 
long term memory and logical reasoning. We will have subjects take breaks during 
the experiment to view film clips that will impact either their mood or arousal level 
thereby identifying the affective measure behind CEP. Before seeing the question, 
we will allow subjects to choose either high risk or low risk payoff options, thus 
being able to estimate their confidence based on how high an expected gain it takes 
them to choose the high risk payoffs – a behavioral measure of confidence. Compte 
and Postlewaite (2004) also imply that CEP will only occur when feedback is 
imperfect. We therefore only provide feedback probabilistically at 50% of trials. 
     Since papers like Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Bolger et al. (2008), Nowell 
and Alston (2007) and Kruger and Dunning (1999) present evidence that 
overconfidence causes bad outcomes, it seems to be counterintuitive to suggest that 
overconfidence will enhance performance, thus welfare. However, if increased 
beliefs about your ability also positively influence the confidence power, then these 
beliefs could potentially enhance performance in any domain in one of three ways. 
First, increased affective confidence, manifested as feeling of competence or power 
may lead to better performance by means of increased motivation and effort. 
Second, increased affective confidence, manifested as a good mood, might release 
resources from mood repair and/or pessimistic rumination (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). 
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In the psychology literature, there is evidence that general mood influences 
confidence such that better moods tend to lead to greater confidence in being correct 
and in good things happening (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Macleod & Campbell, 
1992; Nygren et al., 1996; Wright & Bower, 1992). There also have been a 
significant number of studies that analyze the effect of positive mood on 
performance (Brand et al., 1997; Isen, 2001; Isen & Erez, 2002). Those articles 
conclude that positive feelings foster clear-headed, well-organized, open-minded, 
flexible problem solving and thinking. From the foregoing discussion we expect that 
the affective measure of confidence will be the main route, if any, whereby CEP is 
realized although we have no prior expectations as to whether any effects will occur 
through changes in motivation, mood or arousal. Therefore, we have separate 
measures of each of these different aspects of the affective measure. 
     The first goal of this study is to determine if performance or behavior is 
significantly affected by confidence level and if so, how confidence affects 
performance. It will be the first study to directly test CEP (Compte & Postlewaite, 
2004) and the only study to analyze which mechanism causes CEP. The second goal 
of this study is to determine in what kind of environments CEP occurs manifested as 
three different tasks requiring three different cognitive abilities. This thesis will 
work in an environment where there is a clear "optimal" learning model, and will 
investigate whether the difference between the optimal model and the actual model 
may actually be beneficial to the subjects. It will also be one of the first works to 
manipulate the confidence, mood, and arousal of our subjects, thereby providing a 
holistic understanding of how confidence may affect future performance. 
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     We have conducted experiments consisting of five sessions in total and we 
have collected data from 128 subjects. This number of subjects is higher than 
generally accepted data pool in experimental economics literature; hence our results 
will be highly inferential.  The point of interest to us in our analysis will be the 
success, risk and feedback variables in each period, movies viewed between blocks, 
five answers to survey questions, difficulty level of each question and task variables. 
All of our other variables and results are derived from these variables.  
     The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews 
related literature. In Chapter 3, we outline the experimental design and procedures 
used. In Chapter 4, we analyze the main results obtained and Chapter 5 concludes. 
Two appendixes contain instructions presented during our experiments and sample 
questions for each task. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The main paper that we base our study on is by Compte and Postlewaite (2004) 
which shows that people's biased perceptions about their future success rates leads to 
better performances thus higher payoffs as a result. They state that their study's aim 
is to depart from neoclassical economic theory which asserts that individuals choose 
an activity depending on expected utility of doing so, where it is assumed that 
probability distribution over outcomes is exogenously given. Compte and 
Postlewaite (2004) incorporated a performance technology into their analysis - a 
person's history of successes and failures affecting the probability of success in 
future attempts. The bias of underrating number of past failures and thus forming 
false expectations about the future success rate is seen as an anomaly by economists, 
however, CEP model demonstrates that these biases are a part of rational 
individual's information processing which leads to increased welfare of them. There 
are also other recent papers theoretically analyzing overconfidence, which prove that 
individuals tend to be overoptimistic (Van den Steen, 2004) and that overoptimism 
(or sometimes defined as overconfidence) of managers about the projects overtaken 
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is beneficial to firms and sometimes managers themselves (Gervais et al., 2007; 
Gervais & Goldstein, 2007). 
     There are many articles claiming that overconfidence result in bad outcomes. 
Roll (1986), amongst others, suggested that the large number of business failures 
might be due to overconfidence on the part of entrepreneurs. One of the first 
experiments to test this hypothesis used a modified Market Entry Game (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999), whereby half of entrants' payoffs depended on their skill (and half 
on chance) – participants' entered the market too much when the payoffs were based 
on skill and made negative returns on average, compared to when payoffs were 
based on chance. The authors proposed that this finding was due to overconfidence 
by entrants in their skill level. However, Camerer and Lovallo neither manipulated 
nor measured confidence directly. In contrast, Bolger et al. (2008) concentrated on 
overconfidence as an independent variable, and by manipulations of confidence 
level measured decisions as a dependent variable. Their results supported Camerer 
and Lovallo's interpretation: increased confidence was associated with excess entry. 
This type of manipulation could also be used in our research; however, we came up 
with a simpler way which would determine confidence level of subjects through the 
experiment as an endogenous variable (risk level choices at each period). 
     Similarly, Kruger and Dunning (1999) argue that people hold overly 
favorable views about themselves in many circumstances. They experimentally 
showed that those people are unskilled in those domains where they are overly 
optimistic and suffer a dual burden: they reach erroneous conclusions and make 
wrong choices and their incompetence does not allow them to realize it. Nowell and 
Alston (2007) report the finding of a survey of student enrolled in economics and 
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quantitative courses at a large public university. They show that students often 
exhibit overconfident grade expectations and tend to overestimate the actual course 
grade at the completion of a course. They explain this finding by the theories of 
student motivation suggesting such overconfidence may lead students to study less 
than if they had accurate grade perceptions. 
     Since above mentioned papers present evidence that overconfidence causes 
bad outcomes, it seems to be counterintuitive to suggest that overconfidence will 
enhance performance. However, in the psychology literature, there is sufficient 
evidence that general mood influences confidence such that better moods tend to 
lead to greater confidence in being correct and in good things happening (Johnson & 
Tversky, 1983; Macleaod & Campbell, 1992, Nygren et al.,  1996; Wright & Bower, 
1992). A possible mechanism leading to these effects is mood-congruent encoding 
and/or activation such that positive memories (e.g. of being right, good things 
happening) become more available when in a good mood than bad memories and 
vice versa for bad moods. 
     In psychological literature there have been a significant number of studies 
that analyze the effect of positive mood on performance. Brand et al. (1997) 
revealed that physical reaction time is influenced by induced mood: subjects with 
positive induced mood showed faster response times than did subjects with negative 
induced mood. Isen (2001) and Isen (2002) present a good review of articles 
analyzing effect of positive affect on cognitive thinking. The articles conclude that 
positive affect – beyond its important effects on memory for, and attitudes toward, 
ads and brands – fosters clear-headed, well-organized, open-minded, flexible 
problem solving and thinking. 
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     The Resource Allocation Model (RAM) proposed by Ellis and Ashbrook 
(1988) can explain the consistent finding that depressed mood has a negative effect 
on memory. RAM suggests that depressed individuals are expected to be so 
absorbed in thinking about depressing things, that the cognitive resources necessary 
for successful memory performance are limited further; cognitive resources may be 
diverted to mood repair. This theory is partially tested by Ellis et al. (1997), who 
show that mood affects subjects' ability to detect contradictory statements in written 
passages: subjects in better mood can distinguish the contradictions more easily than 
the ones in depressed mood.  
     In our research we are considering confidence to be a feeling of power or 
competence - this seems most accurately to capture Compte and Postlewaite's 
meaning of overconfidence (although they are not very clear on this point). In our 
experiment, we directly ask for assessments of confidence defined in this way. In 
contrast, decision-making researchers have generally measured confidence by asking 
for statements of belief about subjective-probability. For example, how sure are you 
that you answered the question correctly? How many questions do you think you got 
right? How many do you think that you will answer correctly in future? To be 
consistent with this work we also measure confidence in this way. The vast majority 
of psychological research on confidence has been concerned with its calibration (i.e. 
the degree to which subjective-probabilities correspond to objective probabilities 
defined as relative frequencies). Although the subject of some controversy, the 
finding of people most commonly being overconfident (subjective probabilities > 
objective probabilities) still has currency (see e.g. Lichtenstein et al, 1982; Tsai et al, 
2008). With regard to the relationship between confidence and performance the 
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focus of studies has consequently been on the effects of performance on confidence 
(i.e. the existence and formation of (biased) beliefs about one's performance) rather 
than on the effects of confidence on performance, the case that we are chiefly 
interested in. 
     It is also notable that in all of the studies described above mood, confidence, 
and emotions were imposed exogenously. In our study, we make subjects sort 
themselves into high or low confidence groups by selecting risk - differing payoff 
levels in each period. Our expectation is that this natural manipulation of confidence 
will give more precise results for our hypothesis. The mood manipulation that we 
will be using will be based on short video clips. The effect of film clips on mood 
was tested by Hewig et al. (2005). The advantage of movie clips over other mood 
manipulation methods in a laboratory (e.g. hypnosis, feedback, social interactions, 
music, text, slides) is that clips have rather high ecological validity, as individuals in 
western societies often use dynamic visual stimuli in order to experience emotions. 
Meta - analyses on emotion induction show that film clips seem to be one of the 
most effective ways to elicit emotions (Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994). 20 movie clips 
were analyzed divided into groups of three to four which targeted specific emotions 
and the result suggested that the selective induction of anger, fear, disgust, sadness, 
and amusement was successful for at least two clips of each target emotion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
 
The experiment was conducted using the software package written for economic 
experiments – Ztree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were selected from students of 
Bilkent University who were at least 18 years old and possessed fluent Turkish.  
Each subject had to complete two of the three tasks, either 44 or 60 periods 
depending on the tasks. The order of questions and task were randomly selected by 
the program increasing the variation in our data set. In the Picture Recall (PR) task, 
subjects saw a picture for 5 seconds and then the question was asked regarding the 
picture they had seen. This task measured short term memory ability. The General 
Knowledge (GK) task asked subjects to answer general knowledge questions and 
was aimed at measuring long term memory. Both of these tasks consisted of 30 
questions. The third task was the Syllogism (SG) task, which measured logical 
reasoning ability of subjects and was considered to be harder and more time 
consuming than the other two tasks, thus consisting of only 14 questions. These 
tasks represent a good range of decision environments in which confidence could 
affect performance. In order to simplify the analysis, subjects had to choose the 
correct answer from the two options provided. 
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     Before seeing each question, subjects were asked to choose between two 
payoff levels with varying risk levels. When they chose option A, they earned X TL 
(Turkish Lira) if the answer was wrong and 2*X TL if the answer was correct. This 
represented the safe payoff level. On the other hand, if they chose option B, they got 
0 TL if the answer was wrong and Y TL if the answer was correct. This in turn 
represented the risky payoff level. The payoffs were designed such that Y > 2*X > 
X > 0. X was equal to 0.10 TL for the Picture Recall and the General Knowledge 
questions and because of the difficulty level of the Syllogism task we set X to be 
0.31 TL. To get more variation in our data, we ranged Y into four different values 
{0.22; 0.23; 0.24; 0.27 TL} for PR and GK task and {0.46; 0.49; 0.52; 0.57 TL} for 
SG task. The selected payoff level endogenizes confidence feeling of our subjects 
and represents the behavioral measure of confidence.   We also randomize feedback 
rule: with 50% probability subjects received true feedback after they answered the 
question.  
Figure 1 summarizes above described process: after stage 3, subjects move on to 
stage 1. 
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Every 15 (7 for SG task) periods subjects were asked to complete a short survey 
which consisted of the following questions:  
1) Out of 15 (7) questions answered how many do you think you got right? 
(PastSuc)  
2) How many do you think you will get right from the next 15 (7) questions? 
(FutSuc) 
3) What is your current mood level on a ten-unit scale? (Mood)  
4) What is your current arousal level on a ten-unit scale?  (Arousal)  
5) What is your current feeling of confidence on a ten-unit scale?  (CPower) 
 
Figure 1: Stages of each period for a given task 
Stage 1: Choose one of the following options: 
Option A: You will earn 2*X if you are correct, X if you are wrong 
Option B: You will earn Y if you are correct, 0 if you are wrong 
Stage 2: See a question and choose the answer from the same screen 
or 
See a picture for 5 seconds and then answer the question about the picture 
Stage 3: Receive a feedback 
Your answer was correct 
or 
Your answer was wrong 
 
Stage 3: See a screen saying  
“You receive no feedback” 
 
50% 50% 
15 
 
 The answers to these questions were not subject to any payoffs and we intended 
them not to be. Since we want to measure the bias of overconfidence, making these 
questions payoff relevant would annul our purpose. 
     During the experimental session, subjects viewed two short movie clips 
which lasted around three and a half minutes. We had a total of four movie clips - 
two funny and two exciting - and subjects viewed two of those clips randomly 
selected. We used these movie clips to manipulate subjects’ emotional state levels 
and thus, understand the mechanism under the possible effect of emotional state on 
performance in different tasks. Movie clip 1 was one of the comic movie clips by 
Mr. Bean. Movie clip 2 was a collection of scenes showing funny babies, animals 
and accidents. Movie clip 3 and 4 was the opening scene of the movie Raiders of the 
Lost Ark and one of the last scenes of Back to the Future 1 and were supposed to 
increase the arousal (excitement) level of subjects.  The survey questions were asked 
just before and after the movie was viewed, hence we were able to directly observe 
the effect of movies on emotional state levels. At the end of the experimental 
sessions, subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire about background information 
such as their major, year of study and their monthly family income. You can see the 
detailed visual design of our experiment on Figure 2.  
Finally, subjects were privately paid their total earnings which consisted of 
performance - related payoffs and show-up fee of 2 TL. The duration of the 
experiment varied between twenty and forty minutes. For a more detailed 
explanation of the experiment please see Appendix A which includes the 
instructions used in the experiment and Appendix B which contains sample 
questions for each task. 
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Figure 2: Design of the Experiment 
15/7 periods of the 
task 
Survey 4 Instructions for the 2
nd
 
task 
15/7 periods of the 
task 
Survey 5 Movie  Survey 6 15/7 periods of the 
task 
Survey 7 Questionnai
re  
Instructions for the 1
st
 
task 
Survey 1  15/7 periods of the 
task 
Movie  Survey 2 Survey 3 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
In this chapter, first we will look at the background information of 128 participants, 
such as their major, average monthly family income and the academic year they 
attend.  Next, we will examine whether there is any evidence that confidence 
enhances performance. Then we will look to see whether people form overestimated 
expectations about their past and future success rates. We will also look how beliefs 
were formed depending on the uncertain feedback received and other factors. 
Finally, we will analyze how movies affect mood, arousal and competence power 
and also the effect of movies on performance by looking at the difference in the 
success rates of subject before and after the movie clip was viewed.   
 
3.1. Subjects’ Background 
We should note that there is little variability in performances of our subject pool, 
which can be seen from the payoffs subjects earned. The maximum performance 
based payoff possible was 15 TL. However, the actual performance based earnings 
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ranged between 9 and 12 TL with average of 10 TL where only two persons earned 
12 TL. The average monthly family income of our participants is 2 918 TL with 
minimum of 500 TL and maximum of 30.000 TL.  
 
Table 1: The Background of Our Subject Pool 
Major # Academic Year # 
Engineer 50 Preparatory Sc. 6 
Psyc 4 Freshmen 24 
Science 18 Sophomore 25 
Economics 12 Junior 37 
Education 4 Senior 27 
Law 4 Graduates 9 
Other 36     
    
 
      
Table 1 summarizes background profile of our subjects. Most of our subjects, 
namely 50 of them were engineers, who are expected to have strong technical 
abilities. 36 of them selected “other” as their department which included arts 
department, other social sciences as international relations, political science etc. We 
have preparatory school as well as graduate level students which added variability to 
our subject pool.  
 
3.2    Does Confidence Enhance Performance? 
As noted above we have, essentially, four measures of confidence: 
- two measures of the cognitive confidence, estimates of past and future 
success rates (PastSuc and FutSuc respectively) 
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- a measure of the affective confidence, namely feelings of confidence power 
or competence (CPower) 
- a measure of the behavioral confidence manifesting itself in choosing the 
high risk payoff levels (Risk) 
FutSuc and CPower are measured before each block of questions, PastSuc and 
Cpower (again) after each block, and Risk before each question – the latter is 
averaged over each block. 
To answer the question of whether confidence enhances performance we 
examine if any of these measures of confidence predict performance in the block of 
questions subsequent to when confidence is measured using block by block simple 
OLS. Table 2 presents the results of this regression. In all of the tasks, we observe a 
significant positive relation between the stated number of perceived percentage of 
correct answers (PastSuc) and the true percentage of correct answer in that block. 
However, this, as we will discuss later, might be the result of subjects’ correct 
assessment of their past performance levels: we do find a significant over-estimation 
of past percentage of correct answers in the SG task, thus naturally we observe a 
greater positive coefficient for the subjects’ belief of percentage of past correct 
answers in the SG task in comparison to the PR and GK tasks. 
Table 2: Confidence Measures' Effect on Performance 
    PR GK SG 
CPower  -0.025 -0.088 -0.028 
FutSuc  -0.012 -0.091 -0.150 
PastSuc  0.337*** 0.362*** 0.46*** 
Risk  0.069* 0.005 0.277*** 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels 
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The signs of the Risk coefficients are positive for all tasks and significant for 
the PR and SG tasks, indicating that in these tasks the more people chose high risk 
payoff levels, the more successful they were. This result does indicate that indeed 
higher confidence level (in its behavioral measure form) affects performance 
positively. Furthermore, this result signals that selecting a risky payoff level might 
affect the efforts spent by subjects: those who chose more risky alternatives did 
exert more effort, thus they were more successful in their tasks. The fact that we 
observe the significance only for the PR and SG tasks strengthens this hypothesis: in 
the GK task, performance level is more related to the background of subjects rather 
than exerted effort level, whereas in the PR and SG tasks the performance can be 
enhanced if more attention, effort and concentration are applied to the task. The 
hypothesis of Compte and Postlewaite (2004) about risky alternatives hereby can be 
confirmed: the agents who are confident about themselves choose risky alternatives 
and this choice translates into more effortful task work, thus performance and the 
welfare of the agents are enhanced. The most robust result is for the SG task; hence 
if we want to generalize our finding, the further discussion about what factors might 
affect the choice of risky alternatives in the SG task is presented in the later sections.  
This result is one the most important results of this thesis, since it partially 
confirms the CEP model. Although, FutSuc and CPower variables are not affective 
on performance levels, we clearly see that the behavioral measure of confidence 
level - Risk did have a significant positive effect on performance in two of our tasks. 
Of course, it can be argued which of the measures of confidence is the most 
trustable. However, we believe that since the choice of payoff level is endogenous to 
the environment of the experiment and does not require subjects to answer explicit 
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questions about their beliefs and feelings, this measure of confidence is the most 
natural one extracted from the decisions and choices of the subjects.  
 In addition to OLS block by block regression, which is somewhat limited to 
fixed effect panel data, we use a different technique - logit panel regression – and 
find that some other variables are related to performance in all tasks. Logit 
regression method is used for prediction of the probability of occurrence of an event 
by fitting data to a logit function logistic curve. It is a generalized linear model used 
for binomial regression. 
 We estimate the following equation for each of the three tasks (Table 3):  
 Pr(Suc) = f (Mood, Arousal, Cpower, Diff, FutSuc, PastSuc, Risk), 
where Pr(Suc) is the probability of succeeding at correctly answering a question as  
a function of mood and arousal measured beforehand and confidence variables 
measured before, after or during the session. The Diff variable is a control variable 
that measures the difficulty level of each question determined after the experiment: 
it takes value 1 if the number of people answering that question was higher than 
70% and value 0 otherwise. The variable Risk is also a binary variable, representing 
the behavioral measure of confidence and takes value 1 if the risky payoff level was 
selected and value 0 otherwise.   
 Table 3 summarizes the results of the logit regression. The coefficient of the 
mood variable is positive and significant with 3% significance level for all of the 
tasks. Generally, it seems that mood level has a positive impact on probability of 
successfully answering questions in all of the tasks; however, the coefficient of 
arousal variable is not significant in any of the tasks. Confidence power variable has 
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a negative coefficient for each task which suggests that the higher confidence power 
feeling is, the lower probability of success at that period becomes.  
 As a control variable, Diff has a negative coefficient and is highly significant 
in all of the tasks. Of more interest, the expected success rate (FutSuc) variable has a 
significant positive effect on probability of success at a 5% level in all of the three 
tasks. The variable denoted as PastCor – is the past percentage of correct answers 
until that period. This variable tells us about the skill level of our subjects. Only in 
the SG task we observe a significant predictive power of the PastCor variable on the 
probability of success. This could be expected since the Syllogism task was the one 
which required a specific skill level of logical reasoning thus subjects getting 
experienced and skill in this task could have performed better in subsequent rounds. 
In the other tasks, although the coefficients are positive, they are not significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Logit Regression 
Dependent Variable - Probability of Success 
  PR GK SG 
Arousal 0.012 0.006 -0.014 
CPower -0.044 -0.089 -0.117* 
Mood 0.059** 0.134*** 0.164** 
Diff -1.017*** -1.557*** -2.532*** 
FutSuc 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.163** 
PastCor 0.019 0.306 0.683*** 
Risk 0.077 -0.154 0.012 
*  10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels 
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While the logit results for CPower are largely in agreement with the OLS block-by-
block analysis reported above we find a difference for FutSuc and Risk variables in 
that they have different significances levels in the logit analysis and in some cases 
different signs. Whereas in the PR and SG tasks OLS regression suggests that the 
number of selected high risk payoff levels positively and significantly affects the 
number of successes at that period, we do not observe any significant results for Risk 
in logit regression (the signs are in agreement). In the logit regression we observe 
that FutSuc variable is highly significant and has positive coefficient in all of the 
tasks, however, OLS block-by-block regression does not confirm this result. This is 
largely due to the fact that in the OLS regression we do count for individual effects, 
whereas the logit regression is with a pooled data. Both regressions carry important 
implication for our analysis: OLS suggests that Risk is effective on performance, 
where as logit shows us that higher FutSuc increases the probability of answering 
the question correctly. In section 3.4 we will see that both of these measures of 
confidence are closely related to each other, thus giving us these results. 
 
3.3 Are People Overconfident? 
 The analyses reported in the previous section are mostly correlational. 
Hence, it is quite possible that participants who reported higher past levels of 
success and/or greater expectations of success in the future are those who are 
actually more skilled and hence subsequently get more questions right; the 
significant positive relationships observed may therefore simply reflect accurate 
perceptions of skill-levels.  But Compte & Postlewaite (2004), and several other 
authors, suggest that people are generally biased towards overconfidence, so is it 
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true that in this study people make over assessments of their past and future 
performance? 
Our PastSuc variable is the answer to the question “How many of the 
previous 15 (or 7) questions do you think you got right?” divided by the number of 
questions in that block.  We calculate the under and overconfidence scores shown in 
Table 4 by task and block by subtracting the appropriate actual percent correct 
attained by each participant from his or her PastSuc estimate. The resulting scores 
show overconfidence when they are positive and underconfidence when they are 
negative.  
For the Picture Recall Task, we observe that in both of the blocks 
participants significantly underestimated their percentage of correct answers by 
around 3.5% points. However, in the General Knowledge task although we observe 
a similar tendency towards underconfidence, this bias was not statistically 
significant, so we conclude that the participants were accurate enough in estimating 
their success rate in previous periods. In the Syllogism task we observe a different 
pattern in belief formation: here the participants overestimated their rate of success 
in previous periods by around 5.7% points.  
Table 4 
H0: %PastSuc - %Correct = 0 
Difference 
%pastsuc-%correct PR GK SG ALL 
DifferencePast1 -3.41** -1.8 4.9* -0.3 
    (1.7) (1.5) (2.3) (1.1) 
DifferencePast2 -3.5** -1.2 6.5** 0.4 
    (1.6) (2.1) (2.2) (1.2) 
ALL -3.5*** -1.5 5.7*** 0.03 
    (1.17) (1.26) (1.6) (0.8) 
* 10%, **  5%, *** 1% significance level, 2- tailed t-test, SD’s are shown 
in parenthesis 
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These results are not particularly supportive of CEP. First, in CEP people 
supposedly discount past failures relative to successes and this should result in a 
general overconfidence bias. It can be clearly seen in Table 4 that there can be 
significant negative, positive or no bias depending on the task. Second, there is no 
bias for general-knowledge questions – this implies that the explanation for the 
positive correlations between confidence and performance that we found for this 
task in Section 3.2 are due to accurate perceptions of skill rather than CEP. 
However, in the other tasks we cannot say that people perceived the true percentage 
of correct answers correctly. Thus, positive relationship found in Section 3.2 
between  PastSuc and percentage of correct answers might be due to some other 
factors. Overall, across tasks we do not observe that people have biased perceptions 
about their past performance: according to Table 4, there is no evidence that people 
discount past failures with a lower rate than successes as Compte & Postlewaite 
(2004) and other authors suggest. 
Next, we analyze how participants’ expectations about their future success 
differed from their actual success rates. FutSuc is the answer of participants to the 
question “How many of the next 15 (or 7) questions do you think you will get 
right?” divided by the number of questions in that block.  By subtracting the actual 
percentage correct obtained we produce under/overconfidence scores as above and 
these are shown in Table 5. 
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By looking at Table 5, we can see that in all of the blocks there was a 
significant overestimation of percentage of correct answers. The greatest difference 
between expected and realized percentage of correct answers is for the General 
Knowledge and Syllogism tasks which is around 9.5% difference. In the Picture 
Recall task there was also a significant overestimation of future percentage of 
correct answers with the average of 7.7%.  
One of the interesting findings that Table 5 presents to us is that in the first 
block when participants were still unfamiliar with the task, the difference between 
expected and realized performance is greater than in the second block.  Formal 
statistical tests confirms this result with 1% significance level (Wilcoxon rank-sum 
and t-test). We can infer from this observation that as the participants became 
acquainted with the task and received some feedback about their performance in that 
task, the overconfidence about future performance level started to decrease but did 
not disappear entirely.  Note that the example questions given at the start of the 
experiment were very easy thereby raising initial expectations of success to 
Table 5 
H0: %FutSuc - %Correct = 0 
Difference 
%futsuc-%correct PR GK SG ALL 
DifferenceFut1 
12.2*** 12.4*** 10.3*** 11.7*** 
(1.91) (1.9) (2.4) (1.2) 
DifferenceFut2 
3.3* 7.4*** 8.3*** 6.3*** 
(2.00) (2.1) (2.9) (1.3) 
ALL 
7.7*** 9.9*** 9.3*** 9*** 
(1.4) (1.4) (1.9) (0.9) 
* 10%, **  5%, *** 1% significance level, 2 – tailed t-test 
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unrealistically high levels – possibly since feedback was only partial it was 
insufficient to fully dampen these high expectations. 
One of the assumptions that Compte & Postlewaite (2004) base their model 
on is that people perceive their past performances incorrectly and are overconfident:  
 
There is also ample evidence that individuals have distorted 
recollection of past events and distorted attributions of the causes 
of success or failure. Recollection of good events or successes is 
typically easier than recollection of bad ones or failures. 
Successes tend to be attributed to intrinsic aptitudes or effort, 
while failures are attributed to bad luck. 
 
In our data, we find out that the perception of the past performance is dependent on 
the environment: whereas in the logical reasoning task we did observe significant 
overconfidence, the underconfidence and accurate perception of true percentage of 
correct answers were evident in the short and long term memory tasks respectively. 
Hence, we disagree with the idea that “recollection of … successes is typically 
easier than recollection of … failures” in most situations, and claim that this 
phenomenon is dependent on the setting. On the other hand, we empirically confirm 
the later part of Compte and Postlewaite’s assumption that people tend to think of 
successes as a product of their effort and skill, whereas failures are attributed mainly 
to some external factors as bad luck. This hypothesis can be verified when we 
compare and contrast Table 4 and Table 5: even when people are accurate or 
underconfident in their beliefs about past, they do believe that in the future they will 
be more successful. Although in both PR and GK tasks the belief about the 
performance in the first block is not over-rated, subjects do report very high rates of 
expected success for the second block of questions. This is a direct indication that 
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with uncertain feedback people are able to assess their past performance truthfully 
(or underrate their actual performance) in some settings attributing negative 
feedbacks to some external factors and be overoptimistic about their future success 
rates not taking into account that past performance might be a good indication of 
their skill level.  In the subsequent section, we discuss the implications of having 
over-rated expected success rate showing that in two of our three tasks this does 
influence the resulting risk taking behavior.  
 
3.4 Where Does Confidence Come from? 
In this section we will look what might affect the confidence levels of our subjects 
for each separate measure of confidence, namely FutSuc, PastSuc, Risk and CPower. 
Thus, we will determine the factors affecting confidence and specifically the 
differences between the determinants for each separate confidence measure. We will 
do block-by-block analysis, taking into account emotional state levels that were 
stated before the block has started and the other variables as feedback, number of 
success and average difficulty level encountered in that block. 
 First we look at the most interesting confidence measure - the risk level 
selected at each period and see how confidence power feeling, mood, arousal levels, 
expected future and assessed past success rates, received positive or negative 
feedback, the number of correct answers as an indication of skill level and the 
average past difficulty levels affect the number of risky payoff levels chosen in that 
block.  
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As we can see from Table 6, in two of the three tasks, FutSuc variable seems 
to be positively related with the choice of risky alternative indicating that in the 
cases when people who estimated their future success rate highly before a block has 
started chose risky payoff level more frequently than the ones which were not 
confident about their future performances.  
Table 6: Dependent variable Risk 
    PR GK SG 
     
Arousal  0.334** 0.089 0.0266 
Cpower  -0.151 -0.091 0.199 
Mood  0.109 0.0998 -0.008 
PastCor  0.399** -0.155 0.014 
FutSuc  -0.123 0.443*** 0.408** 
PosFB  0.294 -0.125 0.1414 
NegFB  -0.177 0.053 -0.325 
AveDiff  0.08 0.085 0.051 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels 
 
This is an important result that confirms that in two of our three tasks two 
measures of confidence, namely cognitive and behavioral confidence, are aligned 
with each other. As it was discussed in the previous section, people do have over-
rated assessment about future success rates that does not dampen with experience 
and feedback. Hence, we can now conclude that this bias translates into more risk-
taking behavior in the GK and SG tasks. For the PR task, only the Arousal and 
PastCor variables have significant and positive signs and the other variables mainly 
have expected signs such as NegFB, PosFB, Mood although not significant 
coefficients. Negative feedback received in the past affects the risk taking behavior 
negatively (decreases behavioral measure of confidence) and positive feedback 
received fosters risk taking behavior.   
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 Whereas higher confidence about future success rate does predict the 
behavioral measure of confidence (risk taking behavior), we do not see any 
significant effect of confidence power feeling before the block has started on the 
number of risky alternatives chosen. One explanation that we can suggest is that the 
answer to the question “How confident do you feel right now?” was interpreted 
differently by the subjects: they might infer their confidence feeling from outside 
factors that happened before they came to the experiment or a general level of 
confidence that they usually felt. The further analysis will show us whether 
confidence power and other measures of confidence such as FutSuc and PastSuc are 
positively correlated with each other. 
Next, we discuss how the expectations about the future success rates are 
formed. With this purpose we look how the FutSuc variable at the second block is 
affected by emotional state levels at that block (Mood, Arousal, Cpower) and 
average difficulty level (AveDiff), percentage of successes, number of positive 
(PosFB) & negative feedbacks (NegFB) and the stated percentage of past success 
rate (PastSuc) of the previous block. The reason for this kind of selection of 
variables is because we believe that before actually seeing the questions, subjects did 
not know what they will encounter, thus their expectations about the future might 
not be realistic. Hence, we choose our dependent variable FutSuc only from the 
second block observations. We can speculate that the expectations about the 
performance in the second block could be significantly affected by the feedbacks 
and difficulty level they encounter in the first bock. 
 According to Table 7, most of the coefficients of our potential predictors are 
not significant and have different signs. The consistent coefficients are of Arousal 
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(all positive and two of them significant), Mood (all positive and one is significant) 
and PastSuc variable (all positive and significant with 1% level). In the Picture 
Recall task we also see a significant relationship between confidence power feelings 
and expected future success rate. One of the notable observations here is that arousal 
and mood levels are good predictors of one of the cognitive measures of confidence 
– the expected future success rate. This observation tells us that the more people are 
aroused and in a higher mood state, they will assess their future performance more 
optimistically. This finding is consistent with the findings of Johnson & Tversky 
(1983) and Wright & Bower (1992) stating that induced happy mood increases the 
stated probability of good things happening and decreases the adversity against risk.  
 
Table 7: Dependent variable Futsuc2 
    PR GK SG 
     
Arousal2  0.249** 0.163 0.251** 
Mood2  0.062 0.319*** 0.173 
Cpower2  0.249** -0.19 -0.084 
AveDiff1  0.176 -0.059 -0.068 
Success1  0.106 0.11 -0.157 
PosFB1  -0.046 -0.25* 0.015 
NegFB1  0.139 0.06 0.147 
PastSuc1  0.380*** 0.528*** 0.7*** 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels 
 
 
The other interesting point in our results is that expected future success rate 
variable is positively and significantly correlated with the last stated past success 
rate variable. People being confident about their past success rates, which we saw 
that was accurate enough for the General Knowledge task, were also confident about 
their future performances. In the Syllogism task, we can infer that people 
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overestimating their past performance levels tended to state higher expected 
probabilities of future success rate. For the other tasks there is no clear explanation 
of why people who were accurate about (or underestimating) their performances 
would state higher expectations about future performance. One justification of the 
consistent positive relationship between PastSuc and FutSuc would be the individual 
effects.  
Next we discuss how the subjective estimate of past success rate is affected 
by other factors such as emotional state levels, average difficulty encountered, 
percentage of correct answers, positive and negative feedback received in that block.  
This analysis will help us to identify the mechanisms under which the beliefs about 
person’s own performance are formed.  
From Table 8, we see the changing effects of emotional state levels on 
beliefs about past success rate: in the PR task arousal, in the GK task mood level and 
in the SG task confidence power feelings seem to positively affect beliefs about past 
success rates. This positive relationship between emotional state levels and PastSuc 
are confirmatory of the studies conducted before: we already know that in most 
cases, increased emotional valence increases the optimism of subjects about future 
and past uncertain events.  
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Table 8: Dependent variable PastSuc 
    PR GK SG 
     
Arousal  0.171** 0.044 -0.022 
Cpower  0.095 0.019 0.258* 
Mood  0.059 0.291*** -0.059 
AveDiff  0.102 0.015 -0.040 
#Success  0.152* 0.108 0.075 
PosFB  0.197*** 0.214*** 0.103* 
NegFB  -0.077 -0.110 -0.306** 
FutSuc  0.297*** 0.438*** 0.329*** 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels 
 
Another interesting and expected result of this analysis is that the number of 
positive feedbacks received always positively affects the beliefs about the past 
success rate. At the same time as expected, the coefficients of negative feedbacks 
have the negative sign in all tasks and it is significant with p-value less that 5% in 
the SG task.  As a result we can firmly accept that uncertain feedback about person’s 
performance plays a crucial role in formation of beliefs about one’s own past 
success rate.  
The other significant variable that has a positive relationship with the belief 
about past success rates is the expectations about the future performance. The last 
two tables indicate that FutSuc and PastSuc variables are highly correlated and both 
of these cognitive measures of confidence are dependent on individual effects: 
people who perceive probabilities differently tend to state their estimates about 
success rates accordingly. People who are confident about their number of successes 
at the beginning of the block tend to state higher percentage of successes at the end 
of the block. 
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 Interestingly enough we do not observe a significant effect of average 
difficulty level of a block on the beliefs about past performance. Subjects did not 
base their beliefs on the nature of the questions encountered or the number of correct 
answers they have given (their implicit skill level). Instead they took into 
consideration the uncertain feedbacks received when they formed beliefs about past 
performance. In most of the cases, both of the cognitive measures of confidence 
were correlated with emotional state variables, which confirm the previous findings 
that increased emotional state levels (in terms of intensity and valence) affect the 
way people perceive probabilities about future and past events.   
 Lastly, we look how confidence/competence power feeling of our subjects is 
related to the other emotional state and confidence variables. Table 9 shows the 
Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between confidence power feeling 
and the other variables. The high correlations are observed between emotional state 
variables: confidence power is predictive by mood and arousal levels by 61% and 
57% points respectively. On the other hand, we do not see any high correlation 
coefficients between the other confidence measures. The answers to the questions 
“How many of the next 15 (or 7) questions you think you will get right?” and “How 
confident do you feel on the ten-point scale?” asked in the same questionnaire were 
not highly predictive of each other. The same observation is true about the 
relationship between PastSuc and CPower variables. On average only 9% variation 
in confidence power variable can be explained by the cognitive measures of 
confidence.  
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We also measure how the number of risky payoff levels chosen in the block is 
related to the confidence power feeling reported at the beginning of the block. 
Again, there is not much correlation between these variables: feeling confident about 
one’s self did not increase the probability of choosing the risky payoff level 
 in that block.  
This correlational analysis demonstrates that confidence power variable is 
indeed an affective state variable rather than behavioral (approach) or cognitive 
(probabilistic) measure of confidence. One of the arguments of Compte and 
Postlewaite (2004) is that the welfare of agents who feel confident will increase 
(assuming that the welfare is directly linked to the payoff received), since confident 
agents will choose high risk payoffs more often, thus earning more at the end in 
average. In our experiment, the confidence power feeling of one’s self does not 
increase the probability of choosing high risk payoff levels or change the perception 
of subjects about future or past success rates as Compte and Postlewaite (2004) 
predicted. This is an important result telling us that risk taking behavior is only 
affected by the people’s perceptions about probabilities of success in the future, 
rather than just their feelings of confidence about themselves or the tasks they are 
overtaking.  
 
Table 9: Correlations with Cpower 
  Mood Arousal FutSuc PastSuc Risk 
CPower 0.6098 0.5699 0.0887 0.0886 0.0189 
36 
 
3.5 Effects of Movies 
Table 10 summarizes the effect of each movie clip on mood, arousal and confidence 
power variables. Since we have asked survey questions just before and after the 
movie clip was viewed we expect that the changes in reported emotional state 
variables could only be caused by movies viewed. Table 10 tells us that in general, 
Movie 2 (the collection of funny scenes) and Movie 4 (the final scene from Back to 
the Future 1) have a significant positive influence on all of three variables. Movie 3 
is unsuccessful in affecting any of the emotional state variables. Whereas Movie 1 
(Mr. Bean) does not have any significant result in either changing mood or arousal 
level but does have a marginally significant effect on CPower. Since Movie 2 was 
specifically aimed to increase the mood level of participants, it is natural that the 
increase in mood variable would be largest for Movie 2 (or Movie 1). However, 
Movie 2 also significantly influenced arousal and confidence power levels. 
Similarly, Movie 4 also was effective in increasing Mood and CPower despite being 
principally designed to increase arousal levels. It therefore seems that these three 
variables are closely related, which was verified in the previous section with high 
correlations among emotional state variables.  
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Table 10: Effect of Movies on Emotional State Variables 
H0:  Difference in Emotional States before and after Movie = 0 (each 
variable measured on a 10-point scale) 
 Mood Arousal CPower 
Movie 1 
0 0.044 0.250* 
(1.4) (1.03) (1.04) 
Movie 2 
0.950*** 0.683*** 0.767*** 
(1.66) (1.52) (1.23) 
Movie 3 
0.222 0.093 0.278 
(1.09) (1.25) (1.24) 
Movie 4 
0.378*** 0.378*** 0.284** 
(1.06) (1.22) (1.1) 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance level, 2-tailed t-test  
 
 In order to understand the possible effects of movies on performance we also 
analyze whether the percentages of correct answers in a block before and after the 
movie clip was viewed was different from each other. Table 11 summarizes these 
results. We see a significant improvement in performance for the Picture Recall task 
after viewing Movie clips 2 and 4. Note that, both of these movie clips were 
affective in enhancing emotional state levels of our subjects. On the other hand, 
Movie clip 1, which did not influence neither of Mood, CPower or Arousal, seems 
to have some negative effect on performance but significant only in the case of the 
Picture Recall task.  Interestingly, we do not see any significant results for the 
General Knowledge and Syllogism tasks. Only the performance of participants 
engaged in Picture Recall task seems to have been significantly affected by movies.  
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Table 11: Effect of Movies on Performance 
H0:  %Correctaftermovie - %Correctbeforemovie = 0 
  PR GK SG 
Movie 1 -9%** -0.50% -10.30% 
Movie 2 7%* 0% 8.90% 
Movie 3 0% 5.90% 5% 
Movie 4 5%* -2.90% 1% 
*  10%, **  5%, ***  1% significance level, 2-tailed t-test 
 
The last two tables tell us the following: in the Picture Recall task the movies that 
were engaging for the subjects were also effective in improving the performance. 
Hence, there is evidence that improved emotional state level via movie clips also 
enhances performance in the PR task. The nature of the PR task required high level 
of concentration and short term memory ability.  The engaging movie clips that were 
viewed in the middle of this task seem to have an effect of “mind clearing” which in 
turn improved the task-required aptitudes. This result combined with Table 2 results, 
indicate that the performance in the PR task is significantly improved with enhanced 
emotional state levels and the number of risky choices selected. Both of these 
predictors might possibly affect the effort level and/or motivation of our subjects 
influencing the resulting performance. Although, the performance in the SG task is 
not affected by emotional state variables, it is affected by risk taking behavior of our 
subjects: again meaning that as subjects chose more risky payoff levels, they exerted 
more effort into the task.  Because of the nature of the task, the GK task was not 
much affected either by the movies (translated into emotional state levels) or risk-
taking behavior since as mentioned before in this task the amount of exerted effort 
would not change performance much.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Our evidence partially support CEP: in two of our tasks, people who choose more 
risky options (behaviorally confident people) and those who think that they will get 
more questions right in the next block are more likely to end up with better 
performances. Furthermore, the enhanced emotional state level (via movie clips) 
translates into better performance across blocks in our PR task. This results is also 
supportive of previous findings by Isen (2001) and Isen & Erev (2002), suggesting 
that better moods improve recall ability. 
In the examples that Compte and Postlewaite (2004) presented in their paper, 
they argue that: 
Whether it's a lawyer presenting a case to the Supreme Court, a 
professional golfer approaching a game winning putt or an 
academic giving a job market seminar, the probability of success 
diminishes if legs are trembling, hands are shaking, or breathing 
is difficult. 
 
This is definitely not the case for our cognitive tasks: in neither of short term, long 
term memory or logical reasoning tasks we observe that feeling of confidence 
interacts with the performance. Confidence power variable interacts with neither risk 
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taking behavior, nor with the expected future success rate. It is an emotional state 
variable closely related to the other two emotional state variables, which only seem 
to enhance performance when mood enhancing movie clip was viewed in the middle 
of the PR task together with other emotional state variables. However, we should 
note here that the examples given by Compte and Postlewaite are drastically 
different from our tasks. Hence, it would be expected that the predictions made by 
them would not be evident in our data.  
 The other prediction by Compte and Postlewaite (2004) that overconfident 
people will choose higher risky options is verified in our analysis. The people with 
higher expectations about future success tend to choose risky options with higher 
frequency.  This might in turn translate into greater number of successes in the PR 
and SG tasks as our OLS regression suggests as well as confidence might manifest 
both as more effort (and possibly success) and as more risky choice. The nature of 
these two tasks requires more motivation and concentration. The careful analysis of 
all of the results suggest that people feeling confident about their future success rates 
are likely to choose higher number of risky options, which in turn increases their 
motivation/effort levels resulting in a better performance in two of our three tasks 
where effort levels are important. The findings by Nowell and Alston (2007) about 
overconfident students spending less effort on their courses and performing poorly is 
not supported in our data. The reason for this is because Nowell and Alston’s 
research did not incorporate the effect of overconfidence on choice of risk levels, 
which in turn might affect effort/motivation resulting in better performance (the 
students who by failing the course are under more risk than the others could be 
better motivated to spend more effort on their course works). The further research 
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can concentrate on the seconds spent contemplating each question and analyze 
whether higher confidence about future and more risk taking increases the time 
spent on each question. For now, we can only speculate that this is the case.  
 Another interesting result that we obtained from our data is subjects’ 
contradictory assessment of past performance across tasks: in the Picture Recall task 
significant under-rating, in the General Knowledge task accurate assessment and in 
the Syllogism task over-rating of past success rates are evident. This contradicts the 
findings of vast literature about the phenomenon of discounting past failures 
explained by availability heuristics – the ability to access good memories better than 
the bad ones (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Ross & Sicoly, 1979). The one reason 
for this result might be the probabilistic feedback that we have given our subject, 
although this does not account for why in different tasks we observe different type 
of belief formation. Most likely the differences were due to the nature of the tasks in 
terms of difficulty level and cognitive abilities they required. 
 Although the bias of discounting past failures did not occur in all of our 
tasks, the bias in forming expectations about future success rates is evident without 
exception in all three of our tasks and blocks. The magnitude of this bias is greater 
in the first block than in the second one indicating that as people get acquainted with 
the task, the difference between the expectations about future success rate and actual 
percentage of correct answers decreases but does not disappear entirely. It is an 
interesting observation that although in two of our tasks subjects do not overestimate 
their past success rates, they do believe that they will do better in the future: this is 
might be an example of a general accepted phenomenon that bad events are 
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attributed to bad luck, whereas good events are thought to be a product of effort and 
skill level. 
 The other interesting observation that we come across in our data is that in 
the state of higher mood, arousal and confidence power, subjects tend to report 
higher probabilities of success for future and past performance. This is supportive of 
the findings by MacLeod & Campbell (1992) and Wright & Bower (1992) 
suggesting that probabilities are viewed differently in different emotional states, 
which also affects risk taking behavior. In our tasks, emotional state level variables 
had a positive predictive effect on FutSuc variable, which in turn fostered more risk 
taking behavior.  
 One of the determinants of the performance of subjects in the Picture Recall 
task was enhanced emotional state level. We could identify that by looking at the 
effect of our movie clips on emotions and comparing the percentage of correct 
answers in the block before and after the movie clip was viewed. We discovered that 
Movie clips 2 and 4 (emotionally the most engaging ones) did act as “mind clearing” 
factor and improved the performance in the second block. Thus, we may conclude 
that in the decision theoretic environments that require short term memory ability, 
the task is best performed mixed with engaging activities.   
A further improvement to the design could include an exogenous 
manipulation of confidence via item difficulty. The difficulty levels obtained from 
pilot sessions could be the control variables such that people facing first easy (hard) 
questions would be overconfident (underconfident) and thus when facing the same 
questions in the next round, we could test if subjects who were more confident 
would score more than those less confident. One other limitation of our design might 
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be due to the closeness of payoffs for risky and safe options in the PR and GK tasks: 
0.20 TL versus 0.22, 0.23 and 0.24 TL. With higher amounts and more distant 
payoff levels (as in the SG task) it is possible that we can get more robust results in 
terms of risk taking decisions and effort/motivation employed.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
Welcome  
You are about to participate in an economic experiment of decision making, where 
you will earn money based on your performance and decisions you make throughout 
the experiment. The money you earn will be paid to you at the end of the experiment 
in cash. Throughout the experiments the unit of account will be in TL. In addition to 
your performance dependent earnings, you will get a lump sum amount of 2 TL as a 
show up fee. Please do not talk to each other during the experiment; otherwise the 
proctors will have the right to banish you from experiment. 
Depending on the task which will be selected randomly by the program, you will 
complete 44 or 60 periods. Each period consists of three parts. First of all, you will 
choose the earning level. Then, you will see the question and answer it. Finally, each 
period will be concluded by feedback screen, where with 50 % probability you will 
receive a feedback about your previous response. Between periods there will be 7 
surveys for you to complete. Each survey will have 4-5 questions. You will also 
view two video clips during the experiment. The responses you provide will be kept 
anonymous and used only by researchers.  
Earnings 
You will have an option to select the earning level each period. Option A and B will 
constitute your earning options to select from. Option A provides you with the safe payoff- 
giving X TL when answer is wrong and 2*X TL when correct, whereas Option B is more 
risky  payoff level, giving Y TL  when correct answer is given and 0 TL when the wrong 
answer is given. 
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About the tasks and Examples 
There are three tasks in our experiment: 
1) Picture recall 
2) General Knowledge 
3) Syllogisms 
 
Each of you will complete only two of these tasks, which will be randomly assigned 
to you by the program.  
The Picture recall and General Knowledge tasks consist of 30 questions each, 
whereas the Syllogism task consist of 14 questions. Before the experiment starts, 
you will get a notice about which task you are about to complete.  
Before seeing the question, you will see the following screen: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this screen, you will select the earning level you will receive for answering the question. 
If you choose option A and if you answer the next question correctly, you will add 2*X TL 
to your earnings. If your answer is incorrect, you will get X TL. If you choose option B and 
if you answer correctly you will get Y and if you answer incorrectly you will get 0 TL. 
Before answering each question, you will see this screen and make a choice. The point you 
have to take into account is that the options are Y > 2*X > X > 0. 
After you selected the option you want, you will see a question screen. For The 
Picture Recall task you will see some picture for 5 seconds and then you will be 
redirected to question screen, where you will be asked a question related to the 
picture you just saw.  
Please choose one of the following options 
Option A: You will get 2*X if answer is correct and X if answer is wrong 
Option B: You will get Y if answer is correct and 0 if answer is wrong 
 
Option A 
Option B 
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For example: 
 
(5 second) 
 
 
 
After 5 seconds the picture will disappear and you will see a question screen as below: 
  
In the picture you just saw, was there a bird? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The moment you click the answer button, the answer will be recorded by the program and 
you will not be able to change it. Hence, do not push the answer button unless you are sure 
about your decision.  
After you have selected the answer you will see the feedback screen. Here, you will get 
feedback with 50 % probability saying “your previous answer was wrong” or “your 
previous answer was correct” and with 50 % probability you will get no feedback, where 
you will see in the screen “No feedback”. 
After completing these stages, one period will end and you will go back to selecting the 
earning level once again for the next question. Example for the syllogism task:  
 
 
  
  
Yes 
No 
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The point in this task is not whether the last statement is true or false.  Rather you want to 
decide whether the last statement is true based on the first two statements. Do the first two 
sentences imply the last one? 
For example here the first two sentences only state that we are both humans, not that we are 
the same, thus the final statement is false.  If the first sentence was “I am a Martian,” the 
second was “You are a Martian” and the final statement was “We are both not humans.” 
Then this would be correct.   
The earnings for the syllogism task are higher. Each syllogism question is equivalent to two 
picture recall or general knowledge questions. 
Example of the general knowledge question 
  
Where is Ankara located? 
 
 
 
 
  
Short Questionnaires 
During the experiment you will be asked to complete few short surveys like the following 
one: 
 
        Correct 
Wrong 
Turkey 
Denmark 
I am human, 
You are human. 
Hence, you are me. 
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              How many of previous * questions you think you got right?   
              How many of the next * questions you think you will get right? 1         
 What is your current mood level at this moment?    
 What is your arousal level at this moment? 1 
       
What is your feeling of confidence at this moment? 11  
 (1 being the worst, 10 being the best) 
 
Answering these questions will not affect your earnings anyhow. They will be kept private 
and be utilized by the researchers.  
 
About the program  
The whole experiment will be conducted on the computer using program Ztree. Due to some 
technical characteristics the program has, sometimes you will be asked to press the button 
Continue to be directed to the next stage. It may take some time for screens to load and we 
are thankful for your patience in these cases.  
Thank you for being a part of our scientific research project 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
 
 
Questions correctly answered more than 95%: 
Q40: What is kinetic energy?  
a) Energy of Movement 
b) Rare energy found in the space 
Q45: Which is the highest mountain of Turkey? 
a) Mount Ağrı 
b) Mount Uludağ 
Q65: Few people enroll in hard classes, 
 Many people have enrolled in this class, 
 Thus, this class is not hard. 
a) True 
b) False 
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Q66: Republicans hate liberals, 
 Senator Snort is a republican. 
 Thus, Senator Snort hates liberals. 
a) True 
b) False 
Questions correctly answered less than 30%: 
 Q21: Is there only 1 vase with flowers? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
 
A Typical Easy Question for Picture Recall Task (80% success): 
 
Q2: Is there a bird in the hat of the female 
mouse? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
A typical Hard Question for Picture 
Recall Task (50% success): 
Q11: Are there only four pillows on the bed? 
a) Yes  
b) No 
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A Typical Easy Question for General Knowledge Task (80% 
success): 
Q44: What is the largest country in the world in terms of area? 
a) Russia 
b) Canada 
 
 
A typical Hard Question for Picture Recall Task (50% success): 
Q52: What is metal mercury?  
a) Is fluid in room temperature 
b) Is extremely radioactive 
 
 
A Typical Easy Question for Syllogism Task (75% success): 
Q72: All animals are vegetarians, 
None of the vegetarians is insect, 
Thus, no insect is an animal. 
a) True 
b) False 
A typical Hard Question for The Syllogism Task (45% success): 
Q73: Some pastels are bright, 
Some colors are not pastels, 
Thus, some colors are not bright. 
a) True 
b) False 
